

Classical Discourses of Liberation: Shared Botanical Metaphors in Sarvāstivāda Buddhism and the Yoga of Patañjali¹

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ABSTRACT: Conventionally, the label 'classical yoga' has been aligned with—and sometimes conflated with—the text of Patañjali's *Yogasūtra*. Yet if we broaden the scope of inspection to a wider textual corpus, we can identify a richer and more complex discourse of classical yoga in soteriological contexts. This discourse is also employed in Buddhist Sarvāstivāda traditions and is semantically and metaphorically entangled across religious boundaries. By comparing passages from the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, this article highlights the botanical image of the seed and its seedbed (the substratum) as a key metaphorical structure in the soteriology of the two texts.

KEYWORDS: *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*; affliction; *āśraya*; classical yoga; *kleśa*; Patañjali; Sarvāstivāda; *Yogasūtra*.

INTRODUCTION

The category 'classical yoga' is most often associated with the *Yogasūtra* of Patañjali,³ a text that together with its *bhāṣya* (commentary) comprises part of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, dated from the fourth to early fifth century CE.⁴ However, this article argues that we should widen the discursive context of

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3. For examples of the commonplace identification of classical yoga with Pātañjala yoga, see Feuerstein (1979: viii–xiii); Potter (1983: 243); Whicher (2000); Burley (2007: 3).
4. Maas has argued that the *Yogasūtra* and its commentary the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* together com-

the category of ‘classical yoga’ beyond the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* to incorporate discussions of yoga elaborated in other roughly contemporaneous texts, such as the Buddhist *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (AKBh) and the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* (YĀBh). There has been a long line of scholars who have remarked on the Buddhist elements or influences in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, including de La Vallée Poussin (1937), Wezler (1984, 1987), Bronkhorst (2007), Angot (2012), Maas (2014b), Squarcini (2015), and Wujastyk (2016). This body of scholarship has significantly shifted analyses of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* towards a more integrated approach to religious context. Once we have agreed that the meaning of the term ‘yoga’ in the fourth and fifth centuries cannot be located solely in the Brahmanic-Hindu continuum and that the practice of yoga evolved from a common *śramaṇa* background of asceticism (Bronkhorst 2007; Samuel 2008), we can then assert that the discourse of yoga was used by various communities in a dialogic environment. There is thus still further enquiry to be made into the question: What constituted the discourse of yoga in the classical period? I will highlight a strand of this discourse, which is centred on a theory of *kleśa* (mental affliction),⁵ in order to show how analysing the cross-textual transposition of soteriological terms, and their metaphorical scaffolding, not only broadens but also deepens our understanding of classical yoga. In particular, I will examine how the image of the seed (*bīja*) of *kleśa* is closely mirrored in related passages from PYŚ 2.4 and AKBh 5.1. When we venture beyond Pātañjala yoga to include other soteriologies that employ the term ‘yoga’, or that share conceptual and metaphoric structures, we find a rich and shared discourse⁶ of liberation. This requires suspending some assumptions about classical yoga, including the basic assumption of which texts and traditions that label should denote. Thus the focus of this present article becomes

prise a single text under the title *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, compiled and composed by Patañjali around 325–425 CE (2008, 2010, 2013: 57–68).

5. For the purposes of this article, I will translate *kleśa* as ‘affliction’, reflecting a common choice in the field of study of classical yoga. However, the predominant translation in Buddhist studies is ‘defilement’, and other common translations in both fields of study are ‘taint’, ‘passion’, and ‘blemish’.
6. ‘Discourse’ indicates a body of language and concepts that extends beyond the boundaries of the text. It provides a useful way of examining conceptual interaction that occurred between communities beyond the ‘hard’ evidence of borrowed textual passages. The term ‘discourse’ in this article draws on two theoretical frameworks. Firstly, in the domain of semiotics and literary criticism, discourse denotes: ‘any coherent body of statements that produces a self-confirming account of reality by defining an object of attention and generating concepts with which to analyse it (e.g. medical discourse, legal discourse, aesthetic discourse)’ (Baldick 2001: 68). Secondly, ‘discourse’ refers culturally to language as a system that has a constitutive relationship with the social reality in which it was produced. Thus text cannot be separated from context. For further discussions on ‘discourse’ in a semiotic analysis of religion, see Yelle (2013: 2–23). For a linguistic-cultural contextualization of ‘discourse’ and an interesting analysis of the history of the use/misuse of the term in an academic context, see Sawyer (2002).

not so much what has been included in the category of 'classical yoga', but rather what has been excluded.

It is always a slippery task to attempt to pin down the meaning of 'yoga' in the early history of the subject. The yoga scholar White has presented the term 'yoga' as an empty signifier that can be filled with an unlimited range of unrelated meanings:

its semantic field—the range of meanings of the term 'yoga'—is so broad and the concept of yoga so malleable, that it has been possible to morph it into nearly any practice or process one chooses ... 'Yoga' has a wider range of meanings than nearly any other word in the entire Sanskrit lexicon.

(2012: 2)

White goes on to list some of these meanings:

The word 'yoga' has also been employed to denote a device, a recipe, a method, a strategy, a charm, an incantation, fraud, a trick, an endeavor, a combination, union, an arrangement, zeal, care, diligence, industriousness, discipline, use, application, contact, a sum total, and the work of alchemists. But this is by no means an exhaustive list.

(p. 2)

The main difficulty with this description of semantic malleability is that we run the danger of dehistoricizing and decontextualizing 'yoga' as a term. Yet if it is problematic to characterize the semantic field of 'yoga' too broadly, then there is a correlative risk of treating the discursive context of the term too narrowly. In this case, scholars reduce the semantic field of 'yoga' along religious lines, focusing solely on Buddhist discourse or on Brahmanic. This is, of course, reflective of how field-specialists within the study of religions have worked historically. Yet when we take into account that Sanskrit was a shared language for scholastic writing between Buddhists and Brahmins—and, from the time of Umāsvāti, for Jains too⁷—then we cannot restrict our analysis of yoga discourse to one religious or textual tradition. In his impressive edited volume on the *Yogācārabhūmi* treatise, Kragh suggests that the use of the term 'yoga' in the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* pertains only to Buddhism; it refers to Buddhist practice in general 'covering its entire spiritual path, with special emphasis on the practice of meditation' (2013a: 30). Yet it is debatable as to whether we can practically isolate 'Buddhist parlance', as he calls it, from the wider discourse of yoga. Elsewhere in Buddhist studies, Gethin's definition of 'Buddhist yoga' sounds similar to the yoga of the *Pātañjalayogasāstra*: 'contemplative techniques while sitting in some form of the cross-legged postures' (1998: 174).⁸ The traditional definitions of yoga are entangled, and

7. Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra* (TAS) is the first Jain work to be written in classical Sanskrit. Balcerowicz assigns the TAS to 350–400 CE (2008: 34 fn. 23).

8. Although the topic of *āsana* is discussed briefly in the PYS, at 2.46–48, it refers only to seated postures for staying in meditation, rather than the complex postures of later *haṭha yoga*.

when we try to disentangle them we can tie ourselves up in scholarly knots. In an essay entitled ‘Nets of Intertextuality: Embedded Scriptural Citations in the *Yogācārabhūmi*’, Skilling highlights the difficulties of separating schools of thought within Buddhism and the necessity of foregrounding processes of dialogue, or even what he calls ‘polylogue’:

From a wider perspective, the unabashed intertextuality of Mūlasarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, Vaibhāṣika, and Yogācāra is part of a long process in the history of North Indian Buddhist ideas—a continual dialogue or polylogue.

(2013: 783)

Skilling debunks the categorical myths of separate Buddhist ‘streams’ such as ‘Hīnayāna versus Mahāyāna’ or ‘Mainstream versus Mahāyāna’: ‘There was no Mainstream, there were only many streams’ (2013: 783). Although we cannot overlook the fact that the PYŚ is directed towards a Brahmin audience and clearly aligns itself with Sāṃkhya and the Brahmanic tradition,⁹ I argue that in the fourth and fifth centuries there was not a singular tradition of classical yoga or a set of separate discourses of yoga isolated within discrete religious traditions. In short, religious streams of yoga discourse in the classical period of Indian literature¹⁰ were entangled.

MULTIPLE MODELS OF CLASSICAL YOGA

The polymorphous identity of ‘yoga’ in the classical period has been eclipsed by the well-known definition of *Yogasūtra* 1.2: **yogaś cittavṛttinirodhaḥ** (yoga is the cessation of mental fluctuations).¹¹ Yet it is time to challenge the privileged status of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* as the textual arbiter of ‘classical yoga’.¹² Why has classical yoga not been associated with the Buddhist *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*, a vast compendium on yoga practice with a final redaction in the fourth or fifth century? This omission seems remarkable, given that we have more textual content for Buddhist yoga than Pātañjala yoga in this period. The

9. The overall philosophical frame of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* is clearly Sāṃkhyan, a philosophical tradition aligned with orthodox Brahmanism in later Indian doxographies. Furthermore, as Maas has pointed out (2014a: 73), the text makes clear that the ideal subject is a Brahmin (e.g. PYŚ 3.51; Angot 2012: 653, 656).
10. The parameters of the qualifier ‘classical’ in the category of ‘classical yoga’, most particularly in relation to historical periodization, is a subject for another paper.
11. In this article, *kārikās* and *sūtras* are printed in bold and followed by *bhāṣya* text in non-bold. Printed line numbers are included, unless unnumbered, in which case lines are stated per page.
12. The reasons as to how and why, historically, the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* came to be placed at the centre of the category of ‘classical yoga’ are complex and cannot be explored in this article, due to limitations of space. However, I wish to point to the interplay of factors throughout history, beginning with the Indian doxographies themselves, leading to the convergence of Orientalist depictions with Indian nationalist narratives, and culminating in the transoceanic representations of modern yoga.

Yogācārabhūmīśāstra seeks to comprehensively 'explain the Mahāyāna practice of yoga within the larger frame of Mainstream Buddhist yoga doctrines' (Kragh 2013a: 30). Although the *Yogācāra* tradition has been examined intensely within Buddhist scholarly circles as a Buddhist yoga tradition, it has not, to date, been systematically investigated by scholars of classical yoga. Patañjali's text provides just one snapshot of the emerging systems of yoga in the fourth and fifth centuries; the *Yogācārabhūmīśāstra* provides another snapshot, but one with significantly greater detail. The *Yogācārabhūmīśāstra* was compiled by Asaṅga¹³ during the fourth or fifth century,¹⁴ and presents itself as an explicit and self-labelled discourse on 'yoga'. Depending on context, *yogācāra* primarily means 'yoga practitioner' and secondarily means 'yoga practice' (p. 30).¹⁵ These practitioners, who are generally monks (*bhikṣus*) but can also be laypersons (p. 31), undertake a range of ascetic, ethical, and meditative practices to achieve liberation, or *nirvāṇa*. The text describes many levels or foundations (*bhūmis*) for three ranks of practitioner—the *śrāvaka*, the *pratyekabuddha*, and the *bodhisattva* (respectively the disciple, one with self-enlightened buddhahood, and one with compassionate and fully realized buddhahood). In the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, for example (one of the 14 'books' in the *Yogācārabhūmīśāstra*),¹⁶ we encounter an overall definition of yoga as consisting of four elements: faith (*śraddhā*), aspiration (*chandas*), vigour (*vīrya*), and means (*upāya*).¹⁷ And, in a passage about prescribed methods of yoga, the three levels of training, or *śikṣā*, are explained as higher discipline (*adhiśīla*), higher mind (*adhicitta*), and higher insight (*adhīprajñā*). This passage concludes, 'this, then, is how training is prescribed; the yogi well-engaged in yoga must train therein'.¹⁸ The *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ*,

13. The *Yogācārabhūmīśāstra* is traditionally considered to be the work of a single author and aligned with Mahāyāna Buddhism. The Sanskrit and Tibetan sources name him as Asaṅga, while the Chinese translation refer to Maitreya. However, current scholarship predominantly accepts that Asaṅga was rather a compiler or editor of different strata of material (e.g. Schmithausen 1987: 13–14, 184–85; Kritzer 2005: 13–17; Deleanu 2006: 1, 13).
14. For more on dating, see Kritzer (2005: xviii); Deleanu (2006: 154–201); Kragh (2013a: 25).
15. There is not space here to investigate the different ways to translate *yogācāra*. For discussions on the term 'yogācāra' and its expression in early sources, see Silk (2000); Buescher (2008: 10–15); and Deleanu (2012).
16. The 14 'books' contain 17 levels, or *bhūmis*, as the *Savitarkasavicārādibhūmi* is a collection of three texts combined and the *Sacittikā Acittikā Bhūmiḥ* contains two levels. For a visual breakdown of the structure of the YĀBh, see Kragh (2013a: 51–53).
17. *tatra yogaḥ katamaḥ / āha / caturvidho yogaḥ / tadyathā śraddhā chando vīryam upāyaś ca* (Śbh 2, 9B.7–7b; Wayman 1961: 92).
18. *tatra asty adhiśīlam śikṣā nādhicittam, nādhīprajñam / asty adhiśīlam adhicittam, nādhīprajñam / na tv asty adhiprajñam śikṣā yā vinādhīśīlenādhicittena ca / ato yatrādhiprajñam śikṣā tatra tisrah śikṣā vedītavayāḥ / idam tāvac chikṣāvayavasthānam tatra yoginā yogaprayuktena śikṣītavayam*. 'As for this, there may be training in higher discipline lacking in higher contemplation and higher insight, or training in higher discipline and higher contemplation lacking in higher insight, but there cannot be training in higher insight devoid of higher discipline and higher contemplation. Hence, it should be understood that wherever there is training in higher insight, all three trainings must be there. This, then, is how training is prescribed; the yogi well-engaged in yoga must train therein' (Śbh 2.134; based on trans. Skilling 2013: 779).

the ninth book of the YĀBh,¹⁹ describes four stages of yoga: the conditions for cultivating yoga (*yogabhāvanāpāda*), the foundation for the cultivation of yoga (*yogabhāvanopaniṣat*), the cultivation of yoga (*yogabhāvanā*) and the result of cultivation *bhāvanāphala* (comprised of mundane and supramundane purification) (Sugawara 2013). In the commentarial section of the YĀBh, the eighth chapter of the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*²⁰ contains detail on yoga practice,²¹ as well as a polemic against other ascetics who practice yoga. This is the dialogue between the Buddha and the bodhisattva Maitreya:

Then, on this occasion, the Lord made these statements: ‘This exposition on Dharma and on Yoga, which are without fault, is for the higher good. Those who lean on the Dharma and who practise Yoga vigorously obtain enlightenment.

Those who, in their own interest, reject Yoga and who, for the sake of liberation, scrutinize the Dharma, are as far from Yoga as the sky is from the earth ...

For this reason, abandon refutation and idle debate, and increase your energy. In order to liberate gods and humans, devote yourself to Yoga.’

(SNS 8.41)²²

To underline this point, the chapter closes:

Then the bodhisattva Maitreya said to the Lord: ‘Lord in this sermon of the *Samdhinirmocana*, what does one call this teaching? How is it apprehended?’

The Lord responded: ‘Maitreya: this is “The teaching of the explicit meaning of yoga”’.

(SNS 8.41)²³

19. The *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ* is also called the twelfth foundation or *bhūmi* within the overall structure of the Basic Section of the YĀBh which contains 14 books explaining 17 levels or *bhūmis*.
20. The *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* is an independent work that is quoted (apart from its prologue and its colophons) in one of the supplementary sections of the YĀBh, the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*. Schmithausen (2007) dates the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* to no earlier than the late third century because it refers to the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra* (the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra). Deleau dates this text to 300-350CE (Deleau 2006: 195). The *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* is often viewed as the first Yogācāra work to outline the key philosophical concepts of the school.
21. The chapter describes how to develop *śamatha* (tranquility) and *vipaśyana* (insight), the two bases of Buddhist meditation.
22. From Lamotte’s French translation of the Tibetan: ‘Alors, en cette occasion, le Seigneur dit ces stances: L’exposé du Dharma et le Yoga sans négligence sont un grand bien. Ceux qui s’appuient sur le Dharma et qui pratiquent énergiquement le Yoga obtiennent l’illumination. Ceux qui, en vue de leur intérêt, rejettent le Yoga et qui, pour leur délivrance, scrutent le Dharma, s’écartent du Yoga comme le firmament s’écarte de la terre ... C’est pourquoi, abandonnant toute querelle et toute parole oiseuse, stimule ton énergie. Pour sauver les dieux et les hommes, consacre-toi au Yoga’ (SNS 8.41; Lamotte 1935: 235).
23. ‘Alors le bodhisattva Maitreya dit au Seigneur: Seigneur dans cette prédication de *Samdhinirmocana*, comment appeler cet enseignement? Comment faut-il le prendre? Le Seigneur répondit: Maitreya, c’est l’ “Enseignement de sens explicite sur le Yoga”’ (SNS 8.41; trans. from Tibetan, Lamotte 1935: 236).

Such statements highlight that the YĀBh was as concerned with transmitting knowledge and systems of yoga as the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*. Indeed, even though only one of these streams of discourse has historically been legitimized as 'classical yoga', the practices described in the PYŚ and the YĀBh are both 'classical yoga' in that both texts are self-declared authoritative expositions on yoga produced in the Indian subcontinent in the fourth and fifth centuries.

The *Abhidharmakośakārikā* (AKK) and its auto-commentary the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (AKBh) were produced by Vasubandhu around the fourth century (I will refer to both texts under the label *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*).²⁴ The text describes a debate primarily between the Vaibhāṣikas, who recount the orthodox soteriology of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, and a dissident group called the Sautrāntikas²⁵ who present alternative theories.²⁶ The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is concerned with the path to liberation and the graded levels of meditative attainment, and is deemed by some scholars to contain proto-Yogācāra ideas.²⁷ The discourse of this text is less obviously intermingled with the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* in that the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* does not declare itself to be a text about yoga. However, there are links between the two texts. Most recently, Maas has analysed the inter-relation of two passages in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (PYŚ 3.13 and AKBh 5.25) to argue that Patañjali reworded Vasubandhu's passage to reinterpret Sarvāstivāda dharma transformation theory (Maas 2014b). This present article argues further that the soteric discourse of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the structural components of the path being described clearly resonate with Pātañjala yoga. I will explore a strand of discourse that appears to extend cross-textually between the PYŚ and the AKBh. This complex strand of soteriological thought centres on liberation as eliminating the *kleśas*, or mental afflictions, and appears to be structured around a metaphors of botanical growth. I will begin by examining the method that the PYŚ and the AKBh each describe to remove the afflictions—respectively termed *prasaṃkhyāna* and *pratisaṃkhyā*. I will then outline how both texts propose the necessity of destroying the seeds of affliction

24. For discussions around the identity and affiliation of Vasubandhu and the likelihood of the *bhāṣya* as an autocommentary, see Kritzer (2005: xx–xxii) and Park (2014: 1–29).

25. The Sautrāntikas defined themselves in opposition to the Vaibhāṣikas, who relied on the authority of the *Vibhāṣa* tradition, an orthodox interpretation of Abhidharma scholasticism. In contrast, the Sautrāntikas saw themselves as adhering more closely to an earlier textual tradition, that of the Buddhist sūtras (*P. suttas*), which they believed more accurately represented the truth of the Buddha's teachings. There is still a great deal about the identity and beliefs of the Sautrāntikas that remains unknown. For more details, see Cox (1995: 37–41) and Park (2014: 1–42 and 59–64).

26. Kritzer asserts that 19 positions are attributed to the Sautrāntikas in the AKBh, all of which Vasubandhu agrees with (2005: xxvii).

27. See Kritzer (2005: xxvii–xxx) for a review of numerous scholarly positions on the affinity between the Sautrāntika positions in the AKBh and later Yogācāra texts.

(*kleśabīja*), and the mental substratum (*āśraya*) that contains these seeds, in order to achieve liberation.

PRATISAṂKHYĀ: CONTEMPLATIVE DISJUNCTION
IN THE ABHIDHARMAKOŚABHĀṢYA

While the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* does not identify an entity or practice called ‘yoga’, in its discussion of the unconditioned factors of existence (*asaṃskṛta dharmas*) it posits a technique called *viśamyoga* (disjunction) that entails cessation via analysis (*pratisaṃkhyānirodha*). This contemplative technique generates insight (*prajñā*)²⁸ and is equivalent to cessative liberation (*nirvāṇa*). Specifically, *viśamyoga* is the disjunction of the *kleśas* from the mind (*citta*)²⁹ (AKBh 1.6; Pradhan 1975: 4, ll.7–8). Buddhism’s primary three *kleśas* are *rāga* (attachment), *dveṣa* (aversion), and *moha* (illusion/ignorance), and they are often referred to as the three poisons (*triviṣa*).³⁰ The *kleśas* form part of the set of impure or contaminated factors (*sāsrava dharmas*), which belong to the conditioned state.³¹ Therefore to attain an unconditioned state, one must be free of the *kleśas*. Depending on whether one takes the Vaibhāṣika or the Sautrāntika position, *viśamyoga* can result in mere cessation of the *kleśas* (for the Vaibhāṣikas) or total elimination thereof including any latent forms, or *anuśayas* (for the Sautrāntikas). *Pratisaṃkhyānirodha*³² is equivalent to *viśamyoga*³³ and entails an act of analysis or understanding by reviewing the content of the four noble truths (AKBh 1.5;

28. *duḥkhādīnām āryasatyānām pratisaṃkhyānam pratisaṃkhyā prajñāvīśeṣas tena prāpyo nirodhaḥ* (AKBh 1.5; Pradhan 1975: 4, ll.1–2). ‘*Pratisaṃkhyāna* of the four noble truths of suffering, etc. is *pratisaṃkhyā* (analysis), i.e. a special kind of *prajñā* (insight). By means of that, *nirodha* can be attained.’

29. The mind, in this context, is a series of aggregates.

30. There are many different schemes of *kleśas* in Abhidharma Buddhism. In this period of Sarvāstivāda, the *kleśas* are part of a standardized list of 98 contaminants. For more on this topic, see Lamotte (1974); Cox (1992: 68–69); and Akira (1998: 200–202).

31. *ity etad ākāśādi trividham asaṃskṛtaṃ mārgasatyam ca anāsravā dharmāḥ / kiṃ kāraṇam / na hi teṣu āsravā anuśerata iti*. ‘The three unconditioned [things] of *akāśa* etc. and the truth of the path are pure *dharmas* because the afflictions do not stick to them’ (AKBh 1.4; Pradhan 1975: 3, ll.19–20).

32. From the explanation, we are to understand ‘by *pratisaṃkhyā* cessation can be attained’ (AKBh 1.5; Pradhan 1975: 4, ll.1–2). To expand the description: it is cessation due to analysis in meditation of the real nature of phenomena. *Pratisaṃkhyānirodha* applies specifically to the elimination of each of the *kleśas* that is associated with the three *dhātus*, or realms of existence: *kāmadhātu* (sensual realm), *rūpadhātu* (material realm), and *ārūpyadhātu* (immaterial realm).

33. This assertion is made repeatedly from the first chapter of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: *pratisaṃkhyānirodho yo viśamyogaḥ / yaḥ sāsravair dharmair viśamyogaḥ sa pratisaṃkhyānirodhaḥ* (AKBh 1.5; Pradhan 1975: 3–4). ‘Cessation via analysis is disjunction. Disjunction from the contaminated *dharmas* is cessation via analysis.’

Pradhan 1975: 4, l.1).³⁴ The disjunction that is produced by such analysis not only leads to a cessation of the *kleśas*, but is also prerequisite for the state of *nirvāṇa*, or cessative liberation.

yo dharmam śaraṇam gacchati asau nirvāṇam śaraṇam gacchati pratisaṃkhyānīrodham.
(AKBh 4.32; Pradhan 1975: 216, ll.28–29)

He who takes refuge in the dharma takes refuge in *nirvāṇa*, or *pratisaṃkhyānīrodha*.

This gives us an indirect equivalence: if *viśaṃyoga* is *pratisaṃkhyānīrodha* and *pratisaṃkhyānīrodha* is *nirvāṇa*, then *viśaṃyoga* is also *nirvāṇa*. Indeed, *nirvāṇa* is defined as the cessation of the defilements (*kleśanīrodha*) and of suffering.³⁵ According to the Vaibhāṣikas, disjunction (*viśaṃyoga*) takes place not just once, but repeatedly. Thus *viśaṃyoga* or *pratisaṃkhyānīrodha* must take place separately with each *kleśa*.

viśaṃyogalābhas teṣāṃ punaḥ punaḥ

(AKBh 5.62; Pradhan 1975: 321)

The acquisition of disjunction from them occurs many times.

There are as many cessations as there are afflictions to be abandoned. The condition in which *kleśas* are perpetuated makes *pratisaṃkhyānīrodha* non-absolute, but rather a provisional, continuous, and repeated process. It can thus be viewed as a form of contemplative practice. In contrast, for the Sautrāntikas, *pratisaṃkhyānīrodha* is the extinction of the latent forms of affliction (*anuśaya*) and the extinction of the future arising of life (*janman*) (AKBh, Chapter Two). For them, there is an additional quality of permanence to the extinction of the latent affliction (*anuśaya*)—once it is extinguished there will be no further arising of that *anuśaya*.³⁶ According to the Sautrāntikas, only the higher paths represent the result of disjunction (*viśaṃyogaphala*) and are *nirvāṇa* without remnant (*nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*).³⁷ And what is this remnant? It is the trace of

34. The four noble truths are: the truth of suffering, the truth of the cause of suffering, the truth of cessation, and the truth of the path of cessation. *Pratisaṃkhyānīrodha* is particularly identified with the third noble truth, the truth of cessation: '*pratisaṃkhyānīrodho yo viśaṃyoga' iti nirodhasatyam*. 'Saying "cessation via analysis is disjunction", indicates the truth of cessation' (AKBh 6.1; Pradhan 1974: 327, l.14).

35. See AKBh 4.32: *svaparasaṃtānakleśānām duḥkhasya ca śāntyekalakṣaṇātvāt* (Pradhan 1975: 216, ll.29–30). 'Because [*nirvāṇa* and *pratisaṃkhyānīrodha*] have for their sole characteristic the pacifying of the continuous defilements and suffering of oneself and others.'

36. For the Vaibhāṣikas no *kleśa* could be truly destroyed because of their unique ontology of a dharma existing simultaneously in the past, present, and future.

37. This is in contrast to the other form of *nirvāṇa*: *nirvāṇa* with remnant (*sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*). The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* adheres to the late Sarvāstivāda path-structure and delineates four graded paths: *prayogamārga*, *ānantaryamārga*, *vimuktimārga*, and *viśeṣamārga* (preparatory, successive, liberating, and special) (AKK 6.65; Pradhan 1975: 381). *Viśaṃyoga* is instrumental to *ānantaryamārga*, but also provides a bridge to *vimuktimārga*. *Vimukti* is the attained state of liberation from the defilements (*viśaṃyogaprāpti*). Additionally, two overarching paths of knowledge and cultivation, *darśana* and *bhāvanā*—which were characteris-

past karma that contains the seed of future karma—only *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* (= *visaṃyogaphala*) marks the attainment of this seedless state.

We should, at this point, have a clear sense of how privileged and important a term *pratisaṃkhyā* is in the *Abhidharmakośa*'s discourse of liberation.³⁸ It is situated within a network of equivalences (*visaṃyoga* = *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* = *prajñā* = *nirvāṇa*). It refers to a contemplation that entails reflecting on enumerated content in sequence, such as the four noble truths. For the Sautrāntikas, it eliminates the *kleśas* and their seed. Edgerton's Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit dictionary gives the meaning of *pratisaṃkhyā* as 'careful (point by point) consideration'. This translation refers to both an analytical component ('careful consideration') and an enumerative aspect ('point by point'). But it is somewhat unwieldy and so I will use the translation 'analysis' to translate *pratisaṃkhyā*, as many scholars of Buddhism do, and also because I wish to differentiate it from Patañjali's *prasaṃkhyāna*.

PRASAṂKHYĀNA: CONTEMPLATIVE DISCRIMINATION IN THE PĀTAÑJALAYOGAŚĀSTRA

In the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, Patañjali uses the term *prasaṃkhyāna* to denote a form of contemplation that relates to the *kleśas*.³⁹ I argue that the way in which he employs the term *prasaṃkhyāna* resembles the Sautrāntika soteriology of the AKBh. Firstly, I will outline the context of the link between *prasaṃkhyāna* and the *kleśas* in Patañjali's text, and then turn to the issue of how to translate *prasaṃkhyāna* to reflect its technical meaning.

Pātañjala yoga also posits a theory of *kleśa*. The five *kleśas* are ignorance, egoity, attachment, animosity, and clinging to life (*avidyāsmītārāgadvēṣābhinivēśāḥ kleśāḥ*, YS 2.3). *Avidyā* itself is a field (*kṣetra*), which is the propagative ground (*prasavabhūmi*) of the other four *kleśas*. In total, there are five states in which the *kleśas* may exist and they are all explained via the idea of propagation: (1) dormant (*prasupta*); (2) attenuated (*tanu*); (3) intercepted/cut (*vicchinna*); (4) sustained (*udāra*) and (5) burnt (*dagdha*), the ideal state (PYŚ 2.4). Even though the metaphysical framework is different, Pātañjala yoga, like the contemporaneous Buddhist soteriology, also describes a meditative technique to cut off from the *kleśas*. This is explained as a facet of cognitive concentration (*saṃprajñāta samādhi*):

tic of late Sarvāstivāda (Cox 1992: 75)—are integrated with the basic fourfold path-structure so that, at a certain level of attainment, *bhāvanā* has *visaṃyoga* as its result: *svargāya śīlam prādhānyāt visaṃyogāya bhāvanā* (AKK 4.123; Pradhan 1975: 274, 1.4). 'Essentially, the precepts have heaven for their result; meditation has disconnection for its result' (trans. Pruden 1988-1990: 2, 705).

38. In Buddhist texts of this period, *pratisaṃkhyāna* can also appear as a more general term for contemplation, as in contemplating one's food while one eats.

39. See discussions of *prasaṃkhyāna* pertaining to seven different *sūtras*, albeit primarily located in the *bhāṣya*: PYŚ 1.2, 1.15, 2.2, 2.4, 2.11, 2.12, 4.29, 4.29.

yas tv ekāgre cetasi sadbhūtam arthaṃ dyotayati, kṣiṇoti kleśān, karmabandhanāni ślathayati, nirodham āmukhīkaroti, sa samprajñāto yoga ity ākhyāyate.
(PYŚ 1.1; Maas 2006: 3)

But when the mind is one-pointed, that [*samādhi*] which illuminates an existing (real) object destroys the *kleśas* [and] loosens the bonds of karma; it conduces towards cessation. This cognitive [concentration] [*samādhi*] is called *yoga*.

Furthermore, diminishing the *kleśas* is one of the two stated goals of *kriyā yoga* (the *yoga* of action), one of the main path structures of the PYŚ:

samādhībhāvanārthaḥ kleśatanūkaraṇārthas ca

(YS 2.2; Angot 2012: 379)

It [*kriyā yoga*] has the purpose of cultivating *samādhi* and the purpose of diminishing the *kleśas*.

Destroying the *kleśas* produces cessation (*nirodha*), which leads not to cessative liberation (*nirvāṇa*) in this case but to the epistemological and ontological isolation (*kaivalya*) of pure consciousness (*puruṣa*) from materiality (*prakṛti*), the central teaching of Sāṃkhya. In the PYŚ, one of the chief means of tackling the *kleśas* is a process called *prasamkhyāna*. This is a specific form of meditation or *dhyāna* (PYŚ 2.11) and is also called the *dhyāna* of the cloud of dharma (*dharmameghadhyāna*):

tad eva rajośśamalāpetam svarūpapratīṣṭhaṃ sattvapuruṣānyatākhyātimātraṃ dharmameghadhyānopagaṃ bhavati. tat prasamkhyānam ity ācakṣate dhyāyinaḥ.
(PYŚ 1.2)

That very [*mind*] is endowed with *dharmameghadhyāna*, when it is without the least measure of impurity of *rajas*, when it is established in its own form, and when it only discerns the distinction between *sattva* and *puruṣa*. Those versed in *dhyāna* (*dhyāyinaḥ*) call this [*dharmameghadhyāna*] '*prasamkhyāna*'.

(Maas 2006: 5–6)

As a form of *dhyāna*, *prasamkhyāna* is a higher practice that is pursued after the goals of *kriyā yoga* have been attained: *kriyā yoga* can attenuate the *kleśas* but the practice of *prasamkhyāna* will be required to render them impotent (PYŚ 2.2, 2.11). In the final stage, however, the technique of *prasamkhyāna* must also be abandoned, and, as long as the presence of *vivekakhyāti* (discriminating discernment) remains unwavering, *dharmamegha samādhi* (the *samādhi* that conduces to the cloud of dharma) will arise (YS 4.29). This is the final liberation.⁴⁰ To summarize: *prasamkhyāna* is a form of object-centred medi-

40. Although Śaṅkara's c. eighth-century *Vivaraṇa* states that that at PYŚ 1.2 *dharmameghadhyāna* and *dharmameghasamādhi* are identical [Viv. 1952: 11, lines 21–24], I argue that the statements at PYŚ 4.29 and 4.30–4.31 nonetheless suggest that *dharmameghasamādhi* is distinct from *dharmameghadhyāna*. Firstly, *dharmameghasamādhi* is identified as the possession of *vivekakhyāti* (discriminating discernment) 'in every way' or 'through and through' (*sarvathā*) indicating a completely fulfilled state. Secondly, *dharmameghasamādhi* entails the abandon-

tation that can lead to cognitive concentration, *saṃprajñāta samādhi*.⁴¹ It is an act of contemplation that eradicates the *kleśas* and produces the ultimate form of discriminating discernment (*vivekakyāti*)—of *prakṛti* from *puruṣa*.⁴² We have established, then, that *prasamkhyāna* is a key soteriological term in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*.

TRANSLATING PRASAṂKHYĀNA

Prasaṃkhyāna is generally translated as ‘reflection’ or ‘meditation’. However, I argue that there are technical connotations of the term, which should not be elided.⁴³ I will firstly consider the Brahmanic context of *prasaṃkhyāna*, and then suggest that any translation should take into account the connotations of the semantically and conceptually related Buddhist term *pratisaṃkhyā*. Patañjali’s *prasaṃkhyāna* cannot be said to be a core term of classical Sāṃkhya, as it is notably absent from the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. Neither does the term appear in the proto-yoga formulations of the *Upaniṣads* or the *Bhagavad Gītā*.⁴⁴ *Prasaṃkhyāna*

ment of *prasaṃkhyāna* (discriminative reflection), which is equivalent to *dharmameghadhyāna* (PYŚ 1.2), inferring that *dharmameghasamādhi* is an advanced state beyond *dharmameghadhyāna*. In keeping with soteriological texts of the period, including Buddhist texts, Patañjali treats the terms *dhyāna* and *samādhi* as distinct technical signifiers in his text, so there is no reason to suppose that he collapses the two terms into one when it comes to *dharmamegha*. The progression of *dharmamegha* from a state of *dhyāna* to one of *samādhi* represents the typical sequence from absorption to concentration, such as we see in both Pātañjala and Buddhist schemes of meditation. The literary structure of the PYŚ also infers the importance of *dharmamegha* and the idea of a progression from *dharmameghadhyāna* to *dharmameghasamādhi* in that these two distinct concepts bracket the text itself: *dharmameghadhyāna* is discussed at the opening of the text (PYŚ 1.2) while *dharmameghasamādhi* is discussed at the end of the text (PYŚ 4.29; 4.30–31), suggesting that, within the overall path structure, one begins with technique (*dhyāna*) and finishes with outcome (*samādhi*).

41. Additionally, destruction of the *kleśas* is categorized as part of *saṃprajñāta samādhi* at PYŚ 1.2 (Maas 2006: 3, 5–7), and if *prasaṃkhyāna* is a specific meditational technique to destroy the *kleśas*, then that, too, must be part of *saṃprajñāta samādhi*. Furthermore, *dhyāna* belongs to *saṃprajñāta samādhi*: YS 1.39 includes *dhyāna* at the end of a list of object-centered methods, and the four *samāpattis* of *dhyāna* take gross or subtle objects (PYŚ 1.44; Maas 2006: 76, 11–12).
42. For the view that *prasaṃkhyāna* and *vivekakyāti* are synonyms, see Sundareshan (1998: 67) and Endo (2000: 79). However, I argue that the two terms are distinct in meaning. In the cited passage above (PYŚ 1.2), *sattvapuruṣānyatākhyātimātram* (only discernment of the difference between *sattva* and *puruṣa*) is a description of *prasaṃkhyāna*. This is not identical to *vivekakyāti* (discriminating discernment), because although both terms indicate the same perceptive state, one is provisional (*sattva* from *puruṣa*) and one is ultimate (*prakṛti* from *puruṣa*).
43. Examples of translations of *prasaṃkhyāna* that are somewhat general and elide its technical meaning include: ‘omniscience’ (Mukerji 1983), ‘elevation’ (Feuerstein 1979; Rukmani 2007), ‘enstatic elevation’ (Sundareshan 1998: 68–69), ‘meditation practice’ (Leggett 1990). More fittingly, Oberhammer translates *prasaṃkhyāna* as ‘*Betrachtung*’ (contemplation or reflection) (1977: 139).
44. According to Jacob’s *A Concordance to the Principal Upanishads and Bhagavad Gītā* [sic], the terms *prasaṃkhyā* and *prasaṃkhyāna* do not appear in the *Upaniṣads* or the *Bhagavad Gītā*.

does not occur in the Śānti Parvan of the *Mahābhārata* (MB 12, another key early text on yoga), although there are limited instances of *prasamkhyā*, in a non-meditative context, to denote enumeration or reflection.⁴⁵ However, the term *parisamkhyāna* does occur in the Śānti Parvan in relation to *Sāmkhya*, and it merits examination.

There are different scholarly views as to the basic meaning of *sāmkhya*, derived from the root $\sqrt{khyā}$ ('to make known', 'to be named') and the prefix 'sam-'. Larson gives a useful overview of two main interpretations among western scholars, which I recount here (1969: 1–3). While Garbe opted for a meaning of 'counting' or 'enumeration', Oldenburg preferred the idea of 'examination' or 'calculation' in the analytical sense, and Jacobi argued for a combination of these meanings: analysis of enumerated factors, which refers to the ontological categories (*tattvas*) of *Sāmkhya*. Eliade echoed this interpretation of enumerative analysis, but asserted that it specifically referred to the ultimate soteriological distinction between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. Edgerton interpreted *sāmkhya* as denoting logical reasoning itself, ratiocination. Citing a range of examples from the Śānti Parvan, in which the primary meaning appears to be enumeration (of sense objects, ontological categories, and doctrines),⁴⁶ Larson concludes:

the term 'sāmkhya' refers primarily to the idea of 'number' or 'enumeration' but ... it also signifies those who reason or analyse by means of the enumeration of the categories.

(1969: 3)

I agree that this basic meaning of *sāmkhya* in a philosophical context carries the primary denotations of 'analysis' and (ontological) 'enumeration', with a third less evident sense of 'ratiocination'. At the same time, however, I acknowledge Chakravarti's reminder that *sāmkhya* is a complex term with subtle shades of meaning—he, for example, rejects any translation of 'enumeration' as not only simplistic but incorrect (1975: 1–2). Furthermore, there is a limitation in Larson's analysis of the Śānti Parvan in that, within the examples he highlights, he does not note a difference between *sāmkhya* and *parisamkhyāna*. I suggest that, although we cannot be precise about how the prefix 'pari-' alters the meaning of *sāmkhya*,⁴⁷ the addition of the prefix 'pari-

45. *padātināgabahulā prāvṛṭṭkāle prasāsyaṭe / guṇān etān prasamkhyāya deśakālau prayojayet* (MB 12.101.022; Vol. 13.472) and *evam eṣa prasamkhyātaḥ svakarmapratyayī guṇaḥ / katham cid vartate samyak keśāṃ cid vā na vartate* (MB 12.212.039; Vol. 15.1178).

46. Larson lists as examples MB 12.290.5; 12.294.42; 12.308.79–80 (1969: 3).

47. As with all Sanskrit prefixes, there is a range of meanings attached to 'pari-'. According to Monier-Williams, 'pari-' in *parisamkhyāna* enhances the meaning to indicate a fullness, roundness, or totality to the act of analysis or enumeration. Sundaresan is more confident in asserting the value of such prefixes. In a later Vedānta context, that of *prasamkhyāna* and *parisamkhyāna* in Śaṅkara's *Upadeśasāhasrī*, he argues that such prefixes reflect subtle but key doctrinal differences. While *prasamkhyāna* 'carries primary meanings of counting, enumeration, gathering together and summing up', which according to Sundaresan relate to

is significant and the two terms are distinct in meaning.⁴⁸ In the *Śānti Parvan*, *Sāṃkhya* is the name of the philosophical method,⁴⁹ but *parisaṃkhyāna* is the act itself—of analysis, enumeration, or ratiocination, according to context.⁵⁰ Specifically, the context of *parisaṃkhyāna* in the MB suggests that the addition of the prefix *pari-* to *sāṃkhya* adds agency to the concept, so that *parisaṃkhyāna* indicates a process or an act of reflection.

Having considered this background, let us now return to a suitable translation for Patañjali's *prasamkhyāna*, and to the three options put forward by Larson of 'analysis', 'enumeration' and 'ratiocination'. The translation

a sense of 'omniscience', *parisaṃkhyāna* has these meanings, but also other specific meanings, namely 'exhaustive enumeration, implying exclusion of any other; limitation to that which is enumerated', 'exclusive specification' and 'correct judgement, proper estimate'. Sundaresan concludes: 'Thus both the terms *parisaṃkhyāna* and *parisaṃkhyā vidhi* seem to derive their meanings from the sense of exclusion attached to the addition of the prefix *pari* to the word *samkhyā*' (1998: 83).

48. See, for example: *sāṃkhyadarśanam etat te parisaṃkhyānam uttamam / evaṃ hi parisaṃkhyāya sāṃkhyāḥ kevalatām gatāḥ* (MB.12.303.20; Vol. 15.1676–77) 'This is the knowledge of *Sāṃkhya*, the utmost, [discriminative] reflection (*parisaṃkhyāna*); thus *Sāṃkhya*-adherents who have undertaken [discriminative] reflection attain [ontological] isolation (*kevala*)'. See also this distinction between *sāṃkhya* and *parisaṃkhyāna* as the philosophical subject of knowledge (*sāṃkhyajñāna*) and the act of attaining or implementing reflection/enumeration (*parisaṃkhyāna*): *yogadarśanam etāvad uktaṃ te tattvato mayā / sāṃkhyajñānam pravakṣyāmi parisaṃkhyānidarśanam* (MB 12.294.26; Vol. 15.1634) 'To this extent have I correctly explained to you the teaching of Yoga. I will [now] explain the knowledge of *Sāṃkhya*, which is knowledge of ways of reflecting/enumerating.' This semantic distinction is underlined again: *sāṃkhyadarśanam etāvat parisaṃkhyānadarśanam / sāṃkhyāṃ prakurvate* caiva prakṛtiṃ ca pracakṣate / tattvāni ca caturviṃśat parisaṃkhyāya tattvataḥ / sāṃkhyāḥ saha prakṛtyā tu nistatvāḥ pañcaviṃśakah* (MB 12.294.41–42; Vol. 15.1636). 'The followers of *Sāṃkhya* practise *Sāṃkhya* and expound *prakṛti* having done *parisaṃkhyāna* correctly on the 24 *tattvas* together with *prakṛti*. The 25th is not a *tattva*' [**prakurute* emended to *prakurvate*. Emendation suggested by James Mallinson and supported by several of the manuscripts collated for the critical edition].
49. For further clarification that *sāṃkhya* can mean ratiocination itself, see this verse: *saukṣmyaṃ samkhyākramau cobhau nirṇayaḥ saprayojanaḥ / pañcāitāny arthajātāni vākyam ity ucyate nṛpa*. 'O king, speech is said to be these five things of subtlety, reasoning and argumentation combined, deduction, and motive' (MB 12.308.79; Vol. 15.1716). And for a verse that suggests *Sāṃkhya* as analysis of objects, see *doṣānām ca guṇānām ca pramāṇam pravibhāgaśaḥ / kaṃ cid artham abhipretya sā samkhyety upadhāryatām*. 'When considering a particular object, the evaluation one-by-one of [its] good and bad qualities should be known to be *Sāṃkhya*' (MB 12.308.82; Vol. 15.1717).
50. *Parisaṃkhyāna* might be termed a preparatory contemplation within or before *dhyāna*: *evaṃ hi parisaṃkhyāya tato dhyāyeta kevalam / virajaskamalam nityam anantaṃ śuddham avraṇam* (MB 12.304.16; Vol. 15.1679). 'Having reflected on the list (of powers), one should then meditate on the singular principle, which is free from contamination and impurity, eternal, infinite, pure and whole.' See also *vibhāgajñāsyā mokṣas tu yas tv ajñāḥ sa punar bhavet / kapila uvāca / etāvad evāsure dhyānam anuvarnitam / parisaṃkhyānam api coktam* (MB 12 Appendix I 29B lines 341–42; Vol. 16.2084). 'Kapila said: "There is liberation for him who knows the division, but he who is ignorant is reborn". Kapila said: "Meditation has been described to this extent, O Āsuri. *Parisaṃkhyāna* has also been taught.'"

of 'ratiocination' for Sāṃkhya is somewhat problematic, because ratiocination refers to a reasoning process such as the logical syllogism. Sāṃkhya is not known for its reasoning and syllogisms in the way that Nyāyā (the logical school of philosophy) is, but is rather known as a school that rests on direct and correct perception.⁵¹ I therefore propose that the dual meaning of Sāṃkhya as both 'analysis' (seeing) and 'discernment' (enumerative discrimination) is the more favourable interpretation and appropriately communicates the epistemological basis and authority of *pratyakṣa* (direct perception). Let me argue this point further. As we have seen, *vivekakhyaṭi* is the outcome of *prasamkhyāna*. I, and others, translate *vivekakhyaṭi* as 'discriminating discernment' to reflect that the ultimate goal of Sāṃkhya is discernment (i.e. being able to grasp what is obscure, resting on a metaphor of seeing and sight). What is discerned is a discrimination or distinction at an ontological level: a quantitative—specifically a dualist—distinction between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. Even if one rejects the claim that there is an enumerative aspect to *prasamkhyāna* in the PYŚ, both the aforesaid acts of 'discernment' and 'discrimination' (such as are used to explain the soteriological basis of the PYŚ) rely on differentiation (of one thing from another, of correct from incorrect forms), and differentiation necessarily entails some kind of enumerated content, even if it is only binary. I will thus translate *prasamkhyāna* as 'discriminative reflection' in the sense of a recollection of, or reflection on, differentiated facts or truths. *Prasamkhyāna*, an act of contemplation with differential reflection, carries an embedded sense of enumeration—like Vasubandhu's *pratisamkhyā* does.

Prasamkhyāna has not been widely discussed as a core term of the philosophical vocabulary of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*. Rukmani has considered *prasamkhyāna* in the PYŚ as a possible synonym for *dharmamegha* (the cloud of dharma) (2007). Bader (1990), Sundaresan (1998),⁵² and Endo (2000) have all discussed the supposed co-option of *prasamkhyāna* from the *Yogabhāṣya* by Śaṅkara and his adaptation of it to create a new technique called *parisamkhyāna*, suited to Vedāntic teaching. *Prasamkhyāna* is also mentioned in Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* in a summary of some ancillaries of *aṣṭāṅga yoga*. The dating for this text (the first *bhāṣya* on the *Nyāyāsūtra*) is debated, but Potter (2004: 239) estimates 425–500 CE, and it is generally understood to post-date the PYŚ. Endo (2000: 76) interprets *prasamkhyāna*

51. Although inference (*anumāna*) is included as a valid basis for knowledge (*pramāṇa*) in the PYŚ, the highest epistemological authority is conferred on direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), rather than the tools of logic.

52. Sundaresan assesses Patañjali's use of *prasamkhyāna* in relation to the Vedāntic context, in which Maṇḍana Miśra (c. seventh century CE) refers to it as *prasamkhyāna-vāda*, a Vedic injunction to meditate on Brahman as an absolute principle in order to achieve direct realization. Maṇḍana also characterized *prasamkhyāna* as 'continuous contemplation'. It is possible that this sense of the continuous may be drawn from the MB context in which *parisamkhyāna* is compounded with the adjective *abhagna* 'unbroken', as in *abhagnaparisamkhyāna* (MB 12.325.4.104; Vol. 16.1844).

as ‘the correct consideration to acquire right knowledge (*tattvajñāna*), especially right knowledge of the Self’.⁵³ *Prasaṃkhyāna*, if designed to acquire *tattvajñāna*, entails knowledge of the *tattvas*, or ontological categories, such as are enumerated in *Sāṃkhya*. The passage reads as follows:

tadarthaṃ yamaniyamābhyām ātmasaṃskāro yogāc cādhyātmaavidhyupāyaiḥ ||

tasyāpavargasyādhiḡamāya yamaniyamābhyām ātmasaṃskārah kartavyaḥ / yamaḥ samānam āsramiṇāṃ dharmasādhanam, niyamas tu viśiṣṭam/ ātmasaṃskārah punar adharmahānaṃ dharmopacayaś ca/ yogaśāstrāc cādhyātmaavidhiḥ pratipattavyaḥ/ sa punas tapaḥ prāṇāyāmaḥ pratyāhāro dhāraṇā dhyānam iti / indriyaviśayeṣu ca prasaṃkhyānābhyāso rāga dveṣaprahāṇārthaḥ/ upāyas tu yogācāravidhānam iti.
(*Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* 4.2.46; Thakur: 280)

To this end [there should be] perfection of the self by restraints (*yamas*) and observances (*niyamas*) and through the methods and spiritual practice that result from [the system of knowledge of] *yoga*.

For the sake of the acquisition of that liberation there should be perfection of the self by restraints and observances. Restraints are the same among all ascetics, i.e. the production of virtue [*dharmā*], but observances are particular for each one. Perfection of the self means destruction of the bad and acquisition of the virtuous. Spiritual practice is to be apprehended from the *yoga śāstra*, which consists of austerity (*tapas*), breath control, sense withdrawal, focus and absorption. The practice of *prasaṃkhyāna* on the sense objects is for the purpose of abandonment of attachment and aversion. “Method” means the performance of the practice of *yoga*.

This passage refers to enumerative reflection as a practice (*prasaṃkhyānābhyāsa*) and explains it as contemplation on the sense objects, which leads to the abandonment of the two major *kleśas*, attachment (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*). Regardless of the content of the contemplation (in this case, the sense objects), this *bhāṣya* is nonetheless helpful in illuminating that, in this related text, *prasaṃkhyāna* was understood to indicate an object-centred contemplative technique that eliminates the *kleśas*.

PRASAṂKHYĀNA AND PRATISAṂKHYĀ AS RELATED TERMS

Soteriologically, *prasaṃkhyāna* (along with *parisaṃkhyāna*) in the Brahmanic tradition and *pratisaṃkhyā* in Buddhist Sarvāstivāda appear to belong to a semantic and conceptual family. These terms broadly refer to a contemplative act of reviewing distinct principles with analytical or discriminative application in order to gain understanding (knowledge).⁵⁴ Although the content of the contemplative act differs in Brahmanical and Buddhist traditions, the approach

53. An early commentary on the *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya*, the c. sixth-century *Nyāyavārttika* by Uddyotakara, also defines *prasaṃkhyāna* as the discriminating knowledge between the self and the non-self (*Nyāyavārttika* 4.2.2). For a full discussion see Endo (2000).

54. From early Sarvāstivāda texts, e.g. the *Vijñānakāya*, the path of vision (*darśanamārga*) can

or vehicle of meditation is comparable. Equally, the structural function of this contemplative act (its role and placement within a broader soteriological scheme of karma theory) is also resonant. There is an enumerative aspect to an act of *pratisaṃkhyā* or *prasaṃkhyāna*, which is inextricably part of the analytical act. *Pratisaṃkhyā* and *prasaṃkhyāna* indicate both seeing and counting at the same time. However, *pratisaṃkhyā* carries a specific sense of the sequential consideration of a group of factors, which is not conveyed in *prasaṃkhyāna*.

Another shared feature of the two forms of contemplation is the goal of destroying the *kleśas*. Within Buddhist literature, this function of destroying the *kleśas* by disconnecting from them is consistent and long-standing. Cox notes the absolute primacy of destroying the *kleśas* in late Sarvāstivāda soteriology:

later Sarvāstivādin texts do not present either the practice of concentration or the acquisition of knowledge as the ultimate religious goal, but rather as means for abandoning and preventing the future arising of defilements.

(1992: 66)⁵⁵

Stcherbatsky speculated that the *pratisaṃkhyā* of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is identical with the *prasaṃkhyāna* of the *Yogasūtra*. Although reductive, his argument is worth including here, because he posits that only the prefix *prati-* expresses an orthodox Sarvāstivāda doctrinal point—that each disjunction from *kleśa* must occur individually on a separate basis (1991: 51 fn. 1). However, it is not clear that a singular approach to each *kleśa* is necessarily excluded from Patañjali's *prasaṃkhyāna*. Although the PYŚ does not state explicitly that the *kleśas* must each be treated singly, we are told that their nature is to arise one at a time (PYŚ 2.4; Angot 2012: 381, 9–11) and therefore, presumably, they must be dealt with accordingly.⁵⁶ Furthermore, in the PYŚ the phrase *vivekadarśana-abhyāsa* (PYŚ 1.12; Maas 2006: 40, 6–7) indicates a practice (*abhyāsa*) of discriminating discernment (*vivekakhyaṭi*), and thus implies the repeated application of the technique of *prasaṃkhyāna* to achieve this state.⁵⁷ Additionally, the *prasaṃkhyāna* of the PYŚ appears to entail not

take the four noble truths as its object (Cox 1992: 75–76). This confirms an early precedent for insight having enumerated content in Sarvāstivāda.

55. Even in the earlier canonical *Prakaraṇapāda*—one of the seven texts of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma Piṭaka, composed by Vasumitra around the second century CE—*pratisaṃkhyānirodha* is the means to the ultimate goal of *saṃyojanaprahāna* (abandonment of fetters), the *saṃyojanas* (fetters) being another sub-category of *kleśa* in Buddhism (PP 7 T 26 (1542) 719a 55ff., cited in Cox 1992: 95 fn. 24.)

56. Nonetheless, although the five *kleśas* may arise individually, nescience (*avidyā*) is the master source of the other four, and when *avidyā* is destroyed, it follows that the other four are destroyed too: *paramārthatas tu jñānād adarśanaṃ nivartate tasmin nivṛtte na santy uttare kleśāḥ* (PYŚ 3.55; Angot 2012: 663, lines 6–7). 'But the reality is that, due to knowledge, non-knowledge ceases [and] when that ceases there are no more *kleśas*'.

57. *vivekadarśanābhyāseṇa kalyāṇasrota udghātyate, ity ubhayādhiṇāsa cittavṛttinirodhaḥ* (PYŚ 1.12; Maas 2006: 22, 6–7). 'It (the stream towards evil) is cut off; the stream towards what is

the provisional *kleśanirodha* adhered to by the Vaibhāṣikas, but rather the permanent destruction of the *kleśas* adhered to by the Sautrāntikas; in the PYŚ the *kleśas* must be utterly ‘destroyed’ (*hata*) (PYŚ 4.30; Angot 2012: 723).

To sum up: Vasubandhu’s *pratisaṃkhyā* and Patañjali’s *prasaṃkhyāna* both produce disjunction from the *kleśas* by reflecting on (enumerated) content during contemplation so as to correctly perceive reality. And in the way that *pratisaṃkhyā* produces cessation (*nirodha*), so is *vivekakhyaṭi* a form of ultimate *nirodha* in that it produces the cessation of false identification with, and therefore disjunction from, materiality. The doctrinal or methodical significance of the two prefixes ‘*prati-*’ and ‘*pra-*’ is not entirely clear. However, the *Abhidharmakośa*’s soteriological continuum from *pratisaṃkhyā* to *nirvāṇa* (cessative liberation) shares semantic and structural form with the Pātañjala-yoga continuum from *prasaṃkhyāna* to *kaivalya* (isolating or disjunctive liberation). It is only by reading Patañjali’s *prasaṃkhyāna* in a cross-textual context that we glean more insight into its meaning and function within classical yoga. It is the key contemplative means to eradicate the *kleśas*, and it is essential to liberation.

THE SEED OF KLEŚA

The term *kleśa*, denoting affliction, also has a wider Brahmanical context, appearing briefly in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*⁵⁸ and the *Bhagavad Gītā*,⁵⁹ and more frequently in the Śānti Parvan of the *Mahābhārata*, where it is used to denote *lobha* (greed), *krodha* (anger), *rāga* (attachment), and *dveṣa* (aversion). However, in none of these contexts is *kleśa* presented in relation to the seed (*bīja*) and its substratum (*āśraya*), as it is in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*. Notably, the terms *kleśa* and *kliṣṭa* do not appear in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, the fourth-century treatise on Sāṃkhya. My next section of discourse analysis argues that the seed of *kleśa* (*kleśabīja*) is a uniquely Sautrāntika metaphorical elaboration

wholesome is produced by the practice of the knowledge (*darśana*) that is discrimination’. *Vivekadarśana* here stands in for *vivekakhyaṭi*.

58. *jñātvā devaṃ sarvapāśāpahāniḥ kṣīṃaiḥ kleśair janmamṛtyuprahāniḥ / tasyābhidhyānāt tṛtīyaṃ dehabhede viśvaiśvaryaṃ kevala āprakāmaḥ (Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 1.11)*. ‘When one has known God, all the fetters fall off; by the eradication of the blemishes, birth and death come to an end; by meditating on him, one obtains, at the dissolution of the body, a third—sovereignty over all; and in the absolute one’s desires are fulfilled’ (text and translation Olivelle 1998: 416–17).
59. In the *Bhagavad Gītā*, the term *kliṣṭa* appears in a general context: *dīyate ca parikliṣṭaṃ tad dānaṃ rājasam smṛtam* (BG 17.21). And *kleśa* appears twice in apparently generic contexts: *kleśodhikataras teṣāṃ avyaktāsaktacetasām / avyaktā hi gatir duḥkham dehavadbhir avāpyate* (BG 12.5). And: *niyatasya tu saṃnyāsaḥ karmāno nopapadyate / mohāt tasya parityāgas tāmasaḥ parikīrtitaḥ / duḥkham ity eva yat karma kāyakleśabhayāt tyajet / sa kṛtvā rājasam tyāgaṃ naiva tyāgaphalaṃ labhet* (BG 18.7–8).

within Sarvāstivāda Buddhism, and that Patañjali appears to be co-opting this image from the Sautrāntika discursive sphere.

The metaphorical power of *prasaṃkhyāna* in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* is not restricted to the image of 'discriminating vision'. It is also connected to the image of fire. We are told that the fire of *prasaṃkhyāna* sterilizes the diminished *kleśas* 'as fire, during the process of roasting, sterilizes seeds'.

pratanūḅṛtān kleśān prasaṃkhyānāgninā dagdhabījakaḷpān aprasavadharmaṇaḥ karisyati iti.

(PYŚ 2.2; Angot 2012: 379)⁶⁰

By observing the shared image of fire between *tapas* (asceticism) and *prasaṃkhyāna*, Endo associates *prasaṃkhyāna* with the *tapas* of *kriyā yoga* (2000: 78). Noting the long history of *tapas* in the *Mahābhārata*, in which it is 'believed to bring about a magical power symbolized by heat' (p. 78), Endo concludes of the *Yogabhāṣya*: 'it seems reasonable to suppose that the author of the *YBh* had in mind that *prasaṃkhyāna* has a magical power similar to that of *tapas*' (p. 78). However, as we have noted, *prasaṃkhyāna* is not part of *kriyā yoga*, but is rather an advanced practice beyond *kriyā yoga* (PYŚ 2.2, 2.11).⁶¹ Where Endo's analysis falls short is in focusing solely on the image of fire, and not on the image of the seed. Thus he conflates the heat of *tapas* with the fire of burning the seed, an image attached to *prasaṃkhyāna*. Indeed, *prasaṃkhyāna* contains two different metaphors of sterilization: one is purificatory (sterilizing impurity) and the other is non-propagative (sterilizing potency).⁶² The metaphor of sterilization is one that is linked to the Brahmanical notion of *tapas*,⁶³ but the metaphor of non-propagation of the seed has a different context and is, in many ways, more significant than the image of purificatory fire. While *tapas* burns up the impurities of the past, non-propagation is about preventing the future growth of impurity.

This image of the seed of *kleśa* is crucial in the cross-textual discourse of classical yoga in the fourth and fifth centuries. As we have noted, in the *Abhidharmakośābhāṣya*, the Sautrāntika account of liberation insists that *prati-saṃkhyānirodha* (= *viśamyoga*, disjunction) is not just the cessation of the *kleśas*, but also the destruction of the latent form of *kleśa*, the *anuśaya*, which stops the production of all future seed (*bīja*) of defilement. The destruction of

60. For the same image, see PYŚ 2.4 and 2.13.

61. *Kriyā yoga* is only suitable for the practitioner whose mind is still in an active state (PYŚ 2.1).

62. Endo also glosses over the primary nature of *tapas* as physical asceticism in contrast to *prasaṃkhyāna* as mental discipline. Furthermore, *tapas* is austere practice that leads to heat, while *prasaṃkhyāna* is described as fire itself.

63. As Kaelber explains of *tapas*: 'Through asceticism the sacrificer purifies himself of a profane state. Related, *tapas* comes to be seen as equivalent to penance, yielding atonement for specific transgressions and evil deeds. The "atoning" heat of penance consumes man's evil as a fire consumes dry leaves' (Kaelber 1989: 145).

the *anuśaya*, or latent form, is due to the presence of insight, *prajñā*. Kritzer asserts the central role of seed theory in Vasubandhu's rejection of orthodox Vaibhāṣika positions: in several contexts 'statements by Vasubandhu explicitly or implicitly rely on the idea of *bīja* in giving explanations that deviate from Vaibhāṣika orthodoxy' (Kritzer 2005: xxxv). As in Patañjali's text (PYŚ 2.2, cited above, and also 2.4, 2.13), the image of the burnt seed of *kleśa* also appears in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*:

ato 'gnidagdhavīhivad abijībhūte āśraye kleśānām prahīnakleśa ity ucyate / upahata bījabhāve vā laukikena mārgena.

(Pradhan 1975: 63, ll.22–23)

When the seeds of *kleśas* are damaged either in the *ārya* or by the *laukikamārga*, just like seeds burned by fire that change and cannot produce fruit, then that person is called *prahīnakleśa*.

(trans. Kritzer 2005: 52)⁶⁴

Both the Pātañjala and Sautrāntika soteriologies, then, advocate burning the seed of *kleśa* to sterilize it, and both are ultimately directed towards a mental state that has no seeds. Like the Sautrāntika account, Patañjali's *nirbīja samādhi*, or seedless concentration (systematically outlined in the first chapter of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*), requires the presence of *prajñā* to achieve liberation. This *prajñā*—specifically, truth-bearing insight (*rtambharā prajñā*)⁶⁵—eventually leads to the destruction of all latent imprints of *karma*, which are called *saṃskāras*.⁶⁶

tasyāpi nirodhe sarvanirodhān nirbījaḥ samādhiḥ.

(YS 1.51; Maas 2006: 158)

When that [special *saṃskāra*] is ceased, as a result of everything being ceased, the *samādhi* is without seed.

For this line of enquiry, it is essential to translate *nirbīja* literally (at YS 1.51) to mean 'without seed',⁶⁷ rather than translate it as 'without object', as some scholars have done.⁶⁸ Those who render *nirbīja* metaphorically to mean 'without object' do so in order to make the state of *nirbīja samādhi* correspond to

64. The image of the burnt seed also appears in the commentarial section of the *Yogācāra-bhūmīśāstra*. The *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* of the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* 'compares seeds burned by fire, which are permanently rendered unproductive, with the seeds of internal dharmas that have been destroyed by the *ārya*' (translation and original Tibetan in Kritzer 2004: 52–53).

65. See PYŚ 1.2, 3.50, and 4.29 for clarification that even the *vivekakyāti* produced by *prajñā* must be abandoned.

66. PYŚ 4.28–4.29 clearly states that all *saṃskāras* must be completely eliminated.

67. Maas also makes the link between the term *nirbīja* and the latent seed (Maas 2009: 274 fn. 32).

68. For examples of scholars who translate the *nirbīja* of 1.51 as 'objectless', see Āraṇya (1983: 116) and Raveh (2012: 130). Larson and Bhattacharya translate *nirbīja* as 'without content' (2008: 167) and as either 'seedless or objectless' (2012: 96). Bryant (2009: 164) translates

the other paradigms in the first *pāda* of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, in particular to correlate it to *asamprajñāta samādhi*, non-cognitive or objectless concentration.⁶⁹ While I must concur that *nirbīja samādhi* is a non-cognitive state in which the practitioner no longer engages in objective cognition, this does not account for the technical meaning or function of the seed within this process.⁷⁰ The overall semantic field of *bīja* in the PYŚ is 'seed of *kleśa*' rather than 'seed of cognition', or 'object' (e.g. PYŚ 2.2, 2.4, 2.11, 2.13).⁷¹ Thus the primary meaning of *nirbīja* in *sūtra* 1.51 refers not to the absence of an object in concentration, but to the concentration that contains no seed,⁷² that *samādhi* which is devoid of any future generative seed of *kleśa* and the resulting karma, as the later commentator Śaṅkara explains.⁷³ The *bhāṣya* makes this point clear by explaining how the karmic imprints, *saṃskāras*, are prevented from future arising. The end goal (*adhikāra*) of the material function of mental operation can occur only after the generation of the mental imprints of isolation (*kaivalya*), which have the effect of sublating all other *saṃskāras*:

tasmād avasitādhikāraṃ saha kaivalyabhāgiyaiḥ saṃskārais cittaṃ nivartate.
(PYŚ 1.51; Maas 2006: 160–61, 11–12)

Because the mind whose goal has come to an end ceases together with those *saṃskāras* that are conducive to *kaivalya*.

Eventually, these *kaivalya*-inducing imprints will also cease to exist because they contain no seed.⁷⁴ There is a parallel here with the Sautrāntika theory

nirbīja as 'seedless', but in his commentary on the *sūtra* interprets this as meaning 'not focused on any aspect of an object'.

69. E.g. see Larson and Bhattacharya (2008: 27).

70. Although PYŚ 1.2 and 1.18 argue for an equivalence of *nirbīja* and *asamprajñāta* and PYŚ 1.46 relates *sabīja* to external object, it does not give us free license to interpret 'nirbīja' as 'objectless'. 'Seed' meaning 'object' occurs in only two passages of the PYŚ out of some 40 occurrences of *bīja*. See the next footnote.

71. Apart from its primary technical context as the seed of *kleśa* there are, additionally, other contexts in which the term seed is used generically in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*: the seed of omniscience (YS 1.25); direct perception as the seed of inference and testimony (PYŚ 1.42; Maas 2006: 70, 9–10); the external object of meditation (PYŚ 1.46; Maas 2006: 78, 2–4; PYŚ 2.23, Angot 2012: 460, l. 11); the origin of life as semen (PYŚ 2.5; Angot 2012: 384, l. 5), the seed of error (PYŚ 4.23; Angot 2012: 712, l. 8).

72. The seed of *kleśa* is here related to *saṃskāra* (latent impression) in the way that the Sautrāntikas relate *bīja* to *anuśaya* (latent form).

73. See Śaṅkara's *Vivaraṇa* (c. eighth century CE) on PYŚ 1.2: 'The *samādhi* in this state of inhibition is the seedless. The meaning is, that here the seed is gone; in this all the seeds of taint and so on are gone' (trans. Leggett 1990: 63).

74. Maas points to a further relevant passage that occurs in PYŚ 1.2, 9–13, where the cessation of *vivekakhyaṭi* leads to a state in which only *saṃskāras* remain in the *citta* (*tadavasthaṃ saṃskāropagaṃ bhavati. sa nirbījaḥ samādhiḥ*) and to PYŚ 2.10: *te pañca kleśā dagdhabījakalpā yogināḥ caritādhikāre cetasi pralīne saha tenaivāstaṃ gacchanti* (personal communication 7/12/16). Both of these instances underline the link between *prasamkhyāna* and *vivekakhyaṭi*: when *prasamkhyāna* burns the seed of *kleśa*, the function of the mind is brought to an end,

that, in order for disjunction (= cessation) (*visaṃyoga*) to occur, the latent form of *kleśa* (the *anuśaya*, which contains the seed) must also be eliminated. Furthermore, understanding how the image of the seed works in Pātañjala yoga brings us back to the outcome of *prasamkhyāna* (discriminative reflection): if *prasamkhyāna* destroys the seed, it must lead to *nirbīja samādhi*, the *samādhi* that is seedless. Before positive perception of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* can occur in *vivekakhyāti*, the negative elimination of the seed of *kleśa* must occur via the contemplation called *prasamkhyāna*.⁷⁵

MANIFEST AND LATENT KLEŚAS

Hwang argues that the Sautrāntikas make a unique innovation to the Buddhist theory of the two *nirvāṇas* (enlightenment and final liberation at death) in order to elaborate a theory of causation (2006: 90–97). The Sautrāntikas highlighted a distinction between *sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu*, as *nirvāṇa* with remainder of karmic deposit and of life (*janman*), and *nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu*, as *nirvāṇa* that is devoid of remnant of karmic deposit and of arising of future life (p. 92). The explanatory model used by the Sautrāntikas to anchor these distinctions was that of the seed, or *bīja* (p. 93).⁷⁶ As Park has noted:

this sequential model of causation based on the botanical imagery of seed growth is a characteristic marker by which to discern the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika affiliation.
(2014: 311)

To explain the idea of karmic deposit, the early Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas⁷⁷ shifted the emphasis from *kleśa* to the idea of a latent form of *kleśa*, which they called *anuśaya*. They made this their doctrinal cornerstone (Hwang 2006: 90–97; Park 2014: 464–69).⁷⁸ At this point in time, *anuśaya* was not a common term in the Buddhist canon, and, as Hwang states: ‘this small terminological

a process which creates the condition for *vivekakhyāti* to arise and to produce the *kaivalya saṃskāras* (the karmic impressions that are conducive to *kaivalya*).

75. On the basis of what I have presented so far, it is possible to argue that *nirbīja samādhi* and *dharmameghasamādhi* are synonyms for the same state: (1) *prasamkhyānadhyāna* is a synonym for *dharmameghadhyāna*; (2) *dharmameghadhyāna* and *dharmameghasamādhi* cannot be synonyms because in both the *aṣṭāṅga yoga* method and within Buddhist schemes of meditation, *dhyāna* and *samādhi* are treated as different stages; (3) *dharmameghadhyāna* (= *prasamkhyāna*) logically leads to *dharmameghasamādhi* and not to another type of *samādhi*; (4) *dharmameghadhyāna* (= *prasamkhyāna*) leads to the *samādhi* that is seedless; (5) Therefore the *samādhi* that is seedless (*nirbīja samādhi*) is *dharmameghasamādhi*.
76. See Yamabe (2003: 233) for the counter-argument that Mahāyāna seed theory evolved in the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*; although this seed theory is cited in a summarized form in the AKBh, it is not derived from the Sautrāntikas.
77. There is a debate as to whether the two groups are identical or not. For a summary of views on the relationship between the Sautrāntikas and the Dārṣṭāntikas, see Cox (1995: 37–41) and Park (2014: 59–64).
78. Other Buddhist groups such as the Vibhajyavādins (a northern Indian Abhidharma school)

shift seems to be the key to understanding how nirvana was explained in the Sautrāntika system' (2006: 92). It was thus typical of later Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma texts to engage in 'heated sectarian controversy' over 'the possibility of a distinction between latent and active defilements' (Cox 1992: 69).⁷⁹ In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* this argument plays out between the Vaibhāṣikas, who deny that there are any latent defilements, and the Sautrāntikas, who maintain a dual distinction between the manifest defilement, the *pariyavasthāna*, and the latent defilement, the *anuśaya*.⁸⁰ Thus the discussion of concentration with seed and without seed (*sabīja* and *nirbīja samādhi*) in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* is not only resonant of general discourse within Sarvāstivāda texts, but particularly resonant of the specific debates happening in Sautrāntika circles during the fourth and fifth centuries. This resonance is evidenced in the similarity between the two following passages, which define the seed state of *kleśa*. Patañjali asserts that dormancy (*prasupti*) is when the *kleśa* remains in a seed state (*bījabhāva*) and is not awakened, or *prabodha*. In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, the Sautrāntikas define the dormant *kleśa* as a seed in similar terms.

<i>Pātañjalayogaśāstra</i>	<i>Abhidharmakośabhāṣya</i>
<i>tatra kā prasuptiḥ? cetasi śaktimātrapratiṣṭhānām bījabhāvopagamaḥ. tasya prabodha ālambane saṃmukhībhāvaḥ</i> (PYŚ 2.4; Angot 2012: 381, 2–3)	<i>prasupto hi kleśo 'nuśaya ucyaṭe / prabuddhaḥ pariyavasthānam / kā ca tasya prasuptiḥ / asaṃmukhībhūtasya bījabhāvānubandhaḥ / kaḥ prabodhaḥ / saṃmukhībhāvaḥ / ko 'yaṃ bījabhāvo nāma</i> (AKBh 5.1; Pradhan 1975: 278, ll.20–21)
Of these [modes of existence], what is dormancy? It is the existence in the seed state (<i>bījabhāva</i>) of those [<i>kleśas</i>] that remain in the mind in potential-form only (<i>śaktimātra</i>). Its awakening means that it becomes present (face-to-face) with regard to an object.	For what is called <i>anuśaya</i> is the <i>kleśa</i> in a dormant state. The opposite is [the <i>kleśa</i> in] an awakened state. And what is its dormancy? It is a series of seed states (<i>bījabhāvānubandha</i>) of [an affliction] that has not become present. What is awakening? The becoming present (face-to-face). And what is it that is called the seed state (<i>bījabhāva</i>)?

The passages seem to echo each other, and although I am wary of asserting a direction of influence, it is worth noting that the discursive importance of the seed in Buddhist soteriology was evident long before the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. The *Mahāvibhāṣaśāstra* (first or second century CE, and of which the AKBh is, to

also developed and innovated the theory of the seed of karma and *kleśa* in slightly different ways (Park 2014: 456).

79. The latent defilement, the *anuśaya*, is synonymous with the seed or *bīja*, See *Mahāvibhāṣa* 60 T 27.313a1ff. (cited in Cox 1992: 70) in which it is stated that the *anuśayas* 'are the seeds of manifestly active defilements'.

80. See Park (2014: 433 fn. 896) for a summary of the main positions in this debate.

a degree, a summary)⁸¹ records that the Vibhajyavādins reject the possibility of retrogression for an *arhat*, and they state the following reason:

Contaminants [*anuśaya*] are the seeds of manifestly active defilements. Contaminants are, by nature, not associated with thought; manifestly active defilements are, by nature, associated with thought. Manifestly active defilements are produced from contaminants. [Even if it were said that] one retrogresses from arhatship due to the present operation (*sammukhībhāva*) of manifestly active defilements, since manifestly active defilements would not arise when the contaminants have been abandoned, how could one be said to have retrogression?

(trans. Cox 1992: 70)⁸²

This *Mahāvibhāṣa* passage is one that gives rise to the AKBh's later discussion of the seeds of *kleśa* and how they manifest.⁸³ A similar passage also appears in one of the four commentarial sections of the c. fourth-century *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*, the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*.⁸⁴

There the active (**samudācarita*) and manifest (**sammukhībhūta*) *kleśa* is called *pariyavasthāna*. Its seed, which has not been abandoned (**aprahiṇā*) or destroyed (**asamudghātita*), is called *anuśaya* or *dauṣṭhulya*. Since it is [in a] dormant [state] (*aprabuddha*-[*avasthā*]), it is *anuśaya*, and since it is in the awakened state (**prabuddhāvasthā*), it is **pariyavasthāna*

(trans. Park 2014: 436)⁸⁵

It seems that this particular elaboration of the seed of *kleśa* as having latent and manifest forms is a Buddhist one, and that Patañjali is drawing on such descriptions, if not on the text of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* itself.⁸⁶

81. Although legend relates that Vasubandhu went to Kashmir to study the *Mahāvibhāṣa*, more precisely the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is thought to have been composed on the basis of the **Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*, attributed to Dharmatrāta, early fourth century CE (Willemsen *et al.* 1988: 271).
82. See *Mahāvibhāṣā* 60 T 27.313a1ff. (cited in Cox 1992: 70). Cox invites comparison with a passage from the *Nyāyānusāra* by Saṅghabhadra (NAS 45 T 29.598c16ff.). Both works are extant only in Chinese.
83. See also the Dārṣṭāntika passage in the same *Vibhāṣā*. They assert the difference between latent and manifest *kleśas*. The Dārṣṭāntikas say: 'Wordlings are not able to cut off latent dispositions (**anuśāya*). They are merely able to subdue their outbursts or manifest activity (... *pariyavasthāna*)' (*Vibhāṣā* T 1545.264b; trans. Park 2014: 427 fn. 888).
84. This passage of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* is commenting on the *Savitarkāībhūmi*, one of the 'books' that comprise the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*.
85. Park's translation is based on the Tibetan of Yamabe (2003: 233). Yamabe (2003) and Kritzer (2005: 273) argue that this passage is the forerunner of Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* passage.
86. For the initial indication that the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is a work of interest in understanding the text and context of the PYŚ, I am indebted to Maas' 'Sarvastivāda Abhidharma and the Yoga of Patañjali' (Maas 2014b).

THE POWER OF THE SEED

In the above comparison of PYŚ 2.4 and AKBh 5.1, there is one other technical term that merits consideration. The passage from the PYŚ includes the term *śaktimātra* (meaning 'by power alone') in relation to the seed. The term *śakti* is also used in the Sautrāntika theory of the seed as a synonym for *bījasāmarthya* (the potential of the seed). We also find a reference to *bījasāmarthya* in the PYŚ:

*satām kleśānām tadā bījasāmarthyam dagdham iti viśayasya saṃmukhībhāve 'pi sati na bhavaty eśām prabodha ity uktā prasuptir dagdhabījānām aprarohaś ca.*⁸⁷

(PYŚ 2.4; Angot 2012: 381, 6–7)

Since the seed-potential (*bījasāmarthyam*) is burnt up in those continuing (*satām kleśas*, even though there is direct encounter with the object, they [the *kleśas*] do not awaken—thus is described dormancy and the non-germination of the burnt seed.

In Sautrāntika, the *śakti* or *sāmarthya* of the seed refers to capacity or potential of the seed to produce future afflictions in an individual existence (*ātmabhāva*) (AKBh 5.2). This 'capacity' or 'potential' of the seed forms a key doctrinal point in the Sautrāntika theory of causation within the doctrine of momentariness.⁸⁸ For the Sautrāntikas:

This seed-state itself arises from another, previous defilement and contains the power to produce a subsequent defilement, thereby forming a series (*bījabhāvānubandha*) that belongs to the material basis (*ātmabhāva*, *āśraya*) of a sentient being.

(Cox 1992: 73)

The *śakti* or *sāmarthya* of the seed is intricately bound up with the concept of *bījabhāva*, which also features in both of the passages compared above (PYŚ 2.4 and AKBh 5.1).⁸⁹ Park points out that *bījabhāva* was a technical Sautrāntika definition of *anuśaya* (latent affliction), and that Vasubandhu uses it to emphasize 'the agency or ontological basis of these seeds' in relation to the notion

87. Philipp Maas has pointed out that this reading is probably of secondary origin, because the important manuscripts Tvy, Jd, and Ad as well as the *Vivaraṇa* read differently: *aprarohaś ca*] *aprabodhaś ca* Ad Tvy; *cāprabodhaḥ* Jed. *aprabodhaś ca* YVi 128.22 (personal communication 2/9/17). I have chosen to retain *apraroḥa* (non-germinating) as a technically illustrative expression of 'non-awakened' (*aprabodha*). There is a semantic equivalence between non-germinating (*apraroḥa*) and non-awakened (*aprabodha*), i.e. dormant (*prasupta*).

88. The special transformation of the series (*saṃtānaparināmaviśeṣa*) of the seed replaces the Vaibhāṣika notion of *prāpti*, or acquisition, and the idea that *viśamyoga* (disjunction) is a dharma to be possessed like any other.

89. This notion of *bījabhāva* was used to explain karma in relation to the Sautrāntika ontological position: *ko'ayam bījabhāvānāma. ātmabhāvāsyā kleśajākleśotpādānaśaktiḥ yathānubhavajñānājā smṛtyutpādānaśaktir yathācāṅkurādīnām śāliphalajā śāliphalotpādānaśaktiriti* (AKBh 5.1; Pradhan: 278, 22–24).

of *āśraya* as the ontological basis of mind (AKBh 2.36; Park 2014: 452–53). Such is the dominance of *kleśabīja* within the discourse of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, that, at points, the text defines yoga as the destruction of the *kleśas* and their seeds: it is the lamp of yoga that destroys the darkness of the *kleśas* (PYŚ 3.51),⁹⁰ and *kaivalya* is achieved by one in whom the seeds of *kleśa* have been burnt, cancelling any need for further knowledge (PYŚ 3.55).⁹¹ In addition to the association of *kleśa* with *bīja* and the use of a specific contemplative technique to eradicate such seed (*prasaṃkhyāna*), Patañjali's text has recourse to a range of other related technical concepts that appear in Sautrāntika, namely: the distinction between latent and manifest *kleśa*, the potential of the seed (*bījasāmarthya*; *śakti*), and the sequence of the seed (*bījabhāvānubandha*) that forms the ontological basis of mind (*āśraya*). There can be no doubt that the discourse which surrounds *kleśa* in Patañjali's and Vasubandhu's texts is an entangled one. I am not suggesting that the role of *bīja* within *karma* theory is unique to Sautrāntika, yet the technical elaboration that we see in the PYŚ is closer to Sautrāntika than anything we encounter in Brahmanical sources.⁹²

MENTAL SUBSTRATUM AS SEEDBED OF *KLEŚA*

There is one final point to explore in relation to the seed of *kleśa*. In his analysis of Sautrāntika seed theory, Park identifies not just the botanical metaphor but also another, what he calls the subliminal aspect, or the theory of seed that relates to the idea of a psycho-physical 'substratum' or *āśraya*.⁹³ Let us briefly

90. *kleśatimiravināśī yogapradīpaḥ* (Angot 2012: 653, 13).

91. *na hi dagdhakleśabījasya jñāne punar apekṣā kācid asti* (Angot 2012: 663, 4–5).

92. See e.g. BU 3.9.28 for the analogy of a human life to that of a tree, which comes from a seed. The seed image also appears in CU 6.11.12 in the analogy of how tiny the essence of the self (*ātman*) is. For the image of the manifest springing from the unmanifest, see MB 12.211.1 (in Wynne 2009: 336). See also three contrasting meanings of the term *bīja*, collected together in one passage: to indicate 'soul' (*jīva*), karmic seed that prompts the sense faculty into action, and procreative seed i.e. semen (MB 12.213.10–15, pp. 351–53). For seed meaning 'divine source of all lifeforms' see BhG 7.10, 9.18, 10.39, 14.4. The Sānti Parvan also contains references to *prakṛti* as 'the great receptacle of seed properties' (*bīja dharmānām mahāgrāha*) (MB 12.308 Appendix I 29 A line 22; Vol. 16. 2075) and to *prakṛti* as being *bījadharma* or 'having the quality of seed' (MB 12.308 Appendix I 29 B line 303; Vol. 16.2083). There are many other similar examples in the *Mahābhārata*. See also Wynne's interpretation of the burnt seed as a Buddhist doctrine at MB 12.211.15 (p. 341) and MB 12.211.31–33 (pp. 391–93).

93. In my choice of the word 'substratum' to translate *āśraya*, I refer to the Oxford English Dictionary definition of 'substratum' as 'an underlying layer or substance, in particular a layer of rock or soil beneath the surface of the ground' and also as 'foundation' or 'basis'. 'Substratum' is useful in that it denotes a layer that is beneath the surface (not immediately apparent) and that has a structural depth that provides a foundation for visible growth. In this case, the *kleśa* is a plant that grows from the karmic seed that resides unseen in the 'substratum' or 'subsoil' of the generative field of the mind.

examine how the concept of *āśraya* is treated in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* before turning to the presence of such a concept in the PYŚ. If, indeed, the Sautrāntika theory of seed is found to be mirrored in Patañjali's text in both its botanical and subliminal aspects, it would be difficult to deny the interconnection of the PYŚ with core Sautrāntika thought.

In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, both *āśraya* and *āśaya* are key concepts, respectively denoting 'mental basis/substratum' and 'intention/disposition'. According to the Sautrāntikas, when the *kleśas* are eliminated, the mental basis, the *āśraya*, also disappears. This is because there is a semantic continuum between the term for latent affliction, *anuśaya*, and the term for the basis, the *āśraya*.⁹⁴ Let's look more closely at the semantics. Although *āśraya* and *āśaya* are derived differently in Sanskrit,⁹⁵ the two terms are semantically related.⁹⁶ Furthermore, as Edgerton points out, in Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, *āśaya* (disposition) and *anuśaya* (latent defilement) are near-synonyms. *Anuśaya* is glossed in *Abhidharma* by the term *bīja*. Indeed, the very quality of latency (*anuśaya*) is an attribution of the seed form.⁹⁷ Collectively then, the *anuśayas*, which are in fact seeds, form the substratum (mental basis), or *āśraya*, and cause *kleśas*.⁹⁸ The substratum is therefore a seedbed.⁹⁹ This semantic continuum between *anuśaya-āśaya-āśraya* in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* means that the terms are sometimes used interchangeably.

94. In the Sautrāntika school, the term *āśraya* was used to refer to the substratum of existence that exists independently of momentary existence and which provides the physical support for *citta* (thought) and *caitta* (function of mind). This idea was critiqued within Buddhism for being dangerously close to idea of *ātman*. *Āśraya* was also used in the *Yogācārabhūmīśāstra* to refer to *āśrayaparāvṛtti*, the transformation of the basis (which is the mind, the path, and the proclivities) and which transforms an ordinary person, a *prthagjana*, into an *ārya*, a noble person. The key transformation in *āśrayaparāvṛtti* is the abandoning of the *kleśas*.

95. As follows: *ā-√śri* (*ā* + 'to resort') for *āśraya*, and *ā-√śī* (*ā* + 'to lie') for *āśaya*.

96. See the Pāli-English Dictionary by the Pāli Text Society. In Pāli the Sanskrit *āśaya* is *āśaya*, while *āśraya* is *assaya*. The Pāli *āśaya* is defined as 'abode', 'haunt', 'deposit', and 'inclination' thus overlapping in meaning with *assaya* as 'basis' or 'substratum'.

97. This may partly explain the etymology used to define the word *anuśaya* as meaning 'subtle'—because it comes from *aṇu*, meaning 'atom'. This definition is offered in the *Abhidharmahrdayaśāstra*, in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, and in Yaśomitra's *Vyākhyā* (Cox 1992: 96 fn. 32). The *Mahāvibhāṣa* describes several etymologies for the term *anuśaya*: *aṇu* 'atom' and *anuśerate* 'adheres closely' and later 'grows'. These were both used to reason that *anuśaya* is intrinsic with thought. But a third etymology was *anubadhṅanti* 'they bind', used 'to refer to those contaminants that are dissociated from thought' (p. 71).

98. *Anuśaya* is identified as the cause of *kleśa* in the AKBh: **aprahīṇād anuśayād viṣayāt pratyupasthitāt ayoniśo manaskārāt kleśaḥ** (AKK 5.33; Pradhan 1975: 305, 17–18) 'A *kleśa* [arises] due to non-abandoning of the *anuśaya*, from the encounter with an object, and from non-thorough attention.'

99. Nagao notes that in Vasubandhu's *Triṃśīkākārikā*, *āśraya* is explained as '*ālaya-vijñāna*', which has the characteristics of *vipāka* (maturation) and *sarvabījaka* (universality of seeds). 'The word *ālaya* here has meanings similar to those of *āśraya* ... Thus *ālaya* is a "basis" where the effects (*vipāka*) of all the past are stored and from which the future originates. Accordingly, *ālaya* is *āśraya*' (1991: 79).

In the the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, the terms *āśraya* and *āśaya* are also significant, although *āśaya* is by far the more prominent term.¹⁰⁰ *Anuśaya* appears in a limited context in the PYŚ (and only in relation to the *kleśas*),¹⁰¹ but it is possible that *āśaya*, a near-synonym, stands in for it because, as Edgerton states, occurrences of *anuśaya* in Sanskrit are rare as it is ‘essentially a Buddhist word’.¹⁰² As in the Buddhist literature, there is also a degree of semantic fuzziness between the terms *āśaya* and *āśraya* in the Buddhist-inflected discourse of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*.¹⁰³ In the PYŚ, *āśaya* appears most often in the compound *karmāśaya* and is a term that is conceptually resonant with the Sautrāntika *āśraya* as the ‘karmic substratum’ or ‘mental basis’. Patañjali’s *karmāśaya* is the substratum of karmic deposits, and *āśaya* is causally connected to *kleśa*:¹⁰⁴

kleśahetukāḥ karmāśayapracaye kṣetribhūtāḥ kliṣṭāḥ.

(PYŚ 1.5; Maas 2006: 16–17, ll. 4–5)

The afflicted [*vyrttis*] are caused by the *kleśas* and they become the field of procreation of the accumulation of karmic deposits (*āśaya*).

In the way that *āśraya* in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* indicates the latent ontological basis of mind (*citta*) that gives rise to *kleśa*, *āśaya* in the PYŚ is used to indicate the substratum of mind (*citta*) in which the latent form of *kleśa* dwells (as karmic deposits) and which contains the seed of future action. In this respect, Patañjali’s text seems to be in dialogue with a proto-Yogācāra notion of *āśraya*¹⁰⁵ that had already been put forward in the *Sam̐dhinirmocanasūtra*

100. *Āśaya* appears four times as frequently as *āśraya* in the PYŚ, around 40 times.

101. In the context of *sukhānuśayī rāgaḥ. duḥkhānuśayī dveṣaḥ* (PYŚ 1.11; 2.6; 2.8). *Rāga* and *dveṣa* are two of the primary *kleśas* in Brahmanic and Buddhist discourse.

102. Cox notes that *anuśaya* is the word used least frequently for affliction in the Buddhist *sūtras* (1992: 96 fn. 30). She points to Frauwallner’s argument: it was because *anuśaya* was ‘loose in meaning and infrequently used in the *sūtra* that it became the convenient focus of Abhidharma elaboration’ (p. 96 fn. 30, citing Frauwallner 1971: 75ff.).

103. For recent research on the distinctively Buddhist terminology of parts of the PYŚ see Angot (2012), Squarcini (2015), and Wujastyk (2016).

104. At YS 2.5 *avidyā* is explained, not only as the source of the other four *kleśas*, but also as the generator of *āśaya*: *karmāśaya: eṣā catuṣpadā bhavaty avidyā mūlam asya kleśasam̐tānasya karmāśayasya ca savipākasyeti* (PYŚ 2.5; Angot 2012: 384, 20–21). ‘This *avidyā* is fourfold and is the root of the flow (*saṃtāna*) of *kleśas*, the karmic substratum of deposits, and retribution.’ Another passage reinforces this causal link, from *kleśa* to *āśaya*: *kleśamūlah karmāśayo dṛṣṭādr̥ṣṭajanmavedaniyaḥ* (PYŚ 2.12) ‘The karmic substratum of deposits (*āśaya*) has *kleśas* as its root [and] is to be experienced in the present birth as well as future ones.’

105. Nagao terms *āśraya* ‘one of the most important terms in the Yogācāra Vijñāna-vāda School of Mahāyāna Buddhism’ (1991: 75) and suggests the translations of ‘basis’, ‘support’, or ‘substratum’. The reasons for its importance are its close association with the terms ‘*ālayavijñāna*’ and ‘*paratantra-svabhāva*’ as well as its appearance in *āśraya-parāvṛtti*, the reversal of the basis (p. 75). He analyses a cluster of technical uses of the term *āśraya* in Asaṅga’s *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkara*: namely: ‘(1) substratum, support, (2) basis, (3) seeking shelter, (4) origin, source, (5) agent or subject, in the grammatical sense, (6) physical body,

(third century CE) as the 'storehouse consciousness' or *ālaya-vijñāna*.¹⁰⁶ Additionally, like the Sautrāntikas, the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* posits the complete destruction of the substratum as necessary for liberation:

tallābhād avidyādayaḥ kleśāḥ samūlakāṣaṃ kaṣītā bhavanti kuśalākuśalāś ca karmāśayaḥ samūlaghātam hatā bhavanti.

(PYŚ 4.30; Angot 2012: 723, 1–2)

From attaining that (*dharmamegha*), the *kleśas* of *avidyā* etc. are cut by root and branch and the karmic substrata, good and bad, are destroyed utterly.¹⁰⁷

It is not only *āśaya* that is discussed in the PYŚ but also *āśraya*, which denotes 'basis' in relation to the karmic 'trace' or *vāsanā*. *Vāsanā* is a 'perfuming', 'subtle effect', or 'trace' within the substratum, and is also a key term in the PYŚ, particularly in the fourth *pāda*.¹⁰⁸

manas tu sādḥikāram āśrayo vāsanānām / na hy avasitādhikāre manasi nirāśrayā vāsanāḥ sthātum utsahante.

(PYŚ 4.11; Angot 2012: 687, 6–7)

A mind with a destination is the basis [*āśraya*] of *vāsanās*. But in a mind in which destination is dispensed with, *vāsanās* have no basis [*nirāśraya*] and cannot remain.

Again, this reinforces that, in concord with the Sautrāntikas, Pātañjala yoga entails the elimination of the substratum/basis (*āśraya*). Park has observed that while the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* focuses on the seed (*bīja*) and its power (*sāmarthya*) to account for karma, the predominant images of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* are the substratum/basis (*āśraya*) and the trace, *vāsanā* (Park 2014: 377). Thus Patañjali's discourse appears to be engaging not only the core *bīja* metaphor of the AKBh but also the predominant *vāsanā* metaphor of the YĀBh, as well as the *anuśaya-āśaya-āśraya* semantic continuum of both Buddhist texts. The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* demonstrates that *kleśa-bīja-anuśaya-āśraya* was a metaphorical nexus around which the

sometimes the six sense organs, (7) the total of (human) existence, (8) *dharmā-dhātu* (sphere of dharma), (9) basis of existence (*āśraya*) which is to be turned around (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*)' (p. 75).

106. For more detail on the SNS, see fn. 20. In the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, dated to the fourth or fifth century, *āśraya* is used to stand in for *ālaya-vijñāna* (Forsten 2006: 56 fn. 124). Schmithausen also argues for correspondence between the term *āśraya* and *ālaya-vijñāna* (2007). Furthermore, in the sixth book of the YĀBh, the *Sacittikā Ācittikā Bhūmi*, *nirvāṇa* is without remainder of an existential substratum (*nirupadhiśeṣa nirvāṇadhātu*) because the *ālayavijñāna*, the latent consciousness has ceased.

107. See also, for example: *tatra dhyānam anāśayam*. 'For those [minds with powers] that are born of *dhyāna* are without *āśaya*' (YS 4.6). And the statement that, along with absence of *kleśa*, *karma*, and *vipāka*, absence of *āśaya* is a condition of *īśvara*: *kleśakarmavipākāśayair aparāmrṣṭaḥ puruṣaviśeṣa īśvaraḥ* (YS 1.24).

108. Whereas *karmāśaya* is the seedbed that fructifies in this lifetime, *vāsanās* are more subtle traces of karmic action that will fructify at an unknown point in the future (PYŚ 2.13).

Sautrāntika discourse of liberation was constructed. We also find this nexus in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*, albeit in a more condensed presentation.

CONCLUSION

The discursive ‘gateway’ for this article’s exploration of classical yoga discourse was *pratisamkhyā*, which describes a soteric method of mental disjunction from the *kleśas* in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. *Pratisamkhyā* is semantically resonant with Patañjali’s *prasamkhyāna*. Comparing these two terms reveals that they describe a similar process: liberation is achieved by eliminating not only the germination potential of the seed of *kleśa*, but also the seed of *kleśa* itself and the concomitant seedbed, the mental substratum. Overall, the Sautrāntika and the Pātañjala discourses of liberation share the following structural components:

1. a disjunction between mind (*citta*) and the afflictions (*kleśas*)
2. cessation due to analysis/discriminative reflection (*pratisamkhyā* or *prasamkhyāna*)
3. cessation of the latent form of *kleśa*
4. the transformative function of and eventual abandonment of *prajñā*
5. the permanence of disjunction and cessation from the *kleśas*
6. the disappearance of the mental basis, or substratum, when the afflictions are eliminated
7. the centrality of the image of the seed, and its power, to understanding *kleśa* in relation to karma

It would, of course, be reductive to claim that the soteriological systems presented in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* are identical because, clearly, they are not. There are profound differences in the philosophy and orientation of the two texts.¹⁰⁹ Neither am I claiming to be able to identify a definitive direction of influence in the dialogic resonance, although my suggestion is that Patañjali’s text is responding to the Sautrāntika discourse of the AKBh, as a comparison of passages from PYŚ 2.4 and AKBh 5.1 shows. This article has argued that the soteric path structures of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* overlap. Where there is overlap in particular is in the discourse that surrounds the *kleśas* and how to be rid of them. The redactor Patañjali was, it seems, deeply engaged with the notion of *kleśanirodha*, destruction of the *kleśas* via analysis, a distinctly Buddhist approach to liberation. We should be in no doubt as to the unique elaboration

109. A notable divergence, for example, between the Buddhist discourse of *kleśas* is that of *upakleśa*, or secondary defilement, a notion that is absent from the Pātañjala text. The *upakleśas* stand in distinction to the *mūlakleśas* (root or primary *kleśas*) and are variously schematized as 10, 16, or 20 in number according to different schools.

of the role of *kleśas* within Buddhist Abhidharma soteriology. As Lopez notes, the Buddhist scholastic sees 'the very function of the path as the destruction of the *kleśas* and the prevention of their recurrence' (2000: 182). Cox echoes this point: 'abandoning defilements is indeed the goal of Abhidharma religious praxis and the organizing principle of its construction of the path' (1992: 66). Furthermore, within Buddhism, it is Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma that developed the taxonomic classification of *kleśas* to 'an apex' (p. 74). In comparison, there is no such developed theory of *kleśa* and its seed in the early classical Brahmanic sources on yoga. It is thus time to shine a spotlight on Patañjali's path of *kriyā yoga* with its theory of *kleśābīja*, a path that has been overshadowed historically by disproportionate religious, scholarly, and popular emphasis on the *aṣṭāṅga* path structure.

In investigating a body of discourse called 'yoga' we must view beyond semantics to wider conceptual and intricate metaphoric contexts. A practice does not have to be explicitly labelled 'yoga' for it to share the same discourse or episteme as the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*. It is thus useful to think about soteriological path structures rather than an overall 'phenomenon' called yoga; this can aid us in identifying subtle but structural interconnections between distinct religious traditions. This article presents just a few examples of the many shared terms, metaphors, and paradigms in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* presents a soteriology that it does not call yoga and the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* presents a similar soteriology that it does call yoga, and these two texts share an overlapping discourse with the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*. These texts all offered diverse but entangled accounts of yogic soteriology between the fourth and fifth centuries. Why, then, should only one text be legitimized as describing 'classical yoga'? In order to deepen our critical consideration of what constituted 'classical yoga' we cannot continue to isolate the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* from contemporaneous texts from other religious or philosophical traditions. Indeed, when we focus on the interaction between the diverse communities in this period as discursive, we must accept that the conceptual development of classical yoga was a shared endeavour.

ABBREVIATIONS

AKBh	<i>Abhidharmakośabhāṣya</i>
AKK	<i>Abhidharmakośakārikā</i>
BG	<i>Bhagavad Gītā</i>
BoBh	<i>Bodhisattvabhūmi</i>
MB	<i>Mahābhārata</i>
MVB	<i>Mahāvibhāṣāśāstra</i>
PP	<i>Prakaraṇapāda</i>
PYŚ	<i>Pātañjalayogaśāstra</i>

Śbh	Śrāvakahūmi
TAS	Tattvārthasūtra
YS	Yogasūtra
YBh	Yogabhāṣya
YĀBh	Yogācārabhūmiśāstra
Viv	Vivaraṇa

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